The purpose of this study is to empirically analyze if loan loss provisioning is forward-looking. Using a confi dential dataset that directly helps us identify loan demand and loan supply at the bank level, we test if the banks' provisioning behavior is different before and after the crisis. We fi nd, for the entire sample of banks, loan loss provisioning is forward-looking and statistically signifi cant in the post-crisis period. Our results show that the top quartiles of banks in our dataset exhibit a forward-looking approach to loan loss provisioning both in the pre-and post-crisis period. From a policy perspective, the top quartile of banks in our sample is engaged in forward-looking loan loss provisioning. From an accounting stance, this may be suggestive of the largest banks being more engaged in earnings management and income smoothing than the smallest banks in our sample. However, from the banking regulation perspective, implementing forwardlooking loan loss provisioning is economically intuitive and will help build a countercyclical buffer, thereby strengthening bank balance sheets.
INTRODUCTION
The financial crisis of 2008 has prompted both the accounting and economics profession to reexamine the issue of loan loss provisioning. From an accounting standards point of view, current loan loss provisioning is based on an incurred-loss approach. This means that a bank can provision to the loan loss reserve account only if the loss has been incurred (Refer to Whalen 1994, Balla and Rose 2009) 4 . Typically, banks use historical loss rates to make these non-discretionary provisions to cover credit risks. This backward-looking, incurred-loss approach has serious limitations. Historical loss rates tend to underestimate loan loss provisions if the economy has experienced a sufficiently long boom period akin to the years prior to the 2008 crisis. In the accounting literature, any type of forward-looking discretionary loan loss provisioning by bank managers could be a sign of either capital management or smoothing of income as shown by Ahmed et al. (1999) and Lobo and Yang (2001) . From an accounting standpoint, discretionary loan loss provisioning and resultant capital and earnings management introduce distortions in financial statements.
From an economic and bank regulatory perspective ( Balla et al. 2012) , discretionary loan loss provisioning (forward-looking or dynamic provisioning) and income smoothing could be beneficial because it may reduce procyclicality in bank lending. Balla and McKenna (2012) find that countercyclical loan loss provisioning mitigates the feedback effects between the financial and real sectors of the economy. They find that when banks have sufficient loan loss reserves to cushion against worsening economic conditions, loan loss provisioning does not have to increase drastically during downturns when loan losses tend to be excessive. Consequent increases in loan loss provisions needed to cover loan losses can exceed earnings and hence, reduce bank capital. As a 4 There is a famous case where the SEC challenged the loss reserves of SunTrust Bank. This reinforced the incurred-loss approach to provisioning. Refer to Balla and Rose (2009) for a detailed study.
result, bank capital can become highly volatile in bad times. Faced with increasingly binding capital constraints bank lending may retrench, which in turn can stymie recovery. This is typically referred to as the capital crunch effect.
Research by Bernanke and Lown (1991) , Peek and Rosengren (1995) , Kishan and Opiela (2000, 2006) has provided ample evidence of the link between bank capital and the bank lending channel (Also refer to Peek et al. (1999 Peek et al. ( , 2003 ). Laeven and Majnoni (2003) find that most banks do not provision for loan loss in a timely fashion. Banks start provisioning when downturns set in.
This in turn amplifies the impact of the downturn on capital and lending of banks. Dugan (2009) points out that the current incurred loss model does not allow for forward-looking discretion and judgment to allow for early-in-the-cycle loss provisioning. To quote, " [H] ad banks built stronger reserves during the boom years, they would not need to reserve as much now; they wouldn't need as much additional capital now and would be in a stronger position to support economic growth.
There is undoubtedly clear economic benefit to loan loss provisioning being forwardlooking or counter cyclical. Increasingly, studies are showing that an adequate and sound provisioning approach is one that is forward-looking and is dynamic. In Spain, dynamic provisioning has become part of their macro prudential tool for dealing with the procyclicality of the banking system. The counter-cyclical nature of loan loss provisioning allows for timely detection of credit losses in loan portfolios and to build sufficient reserves. (Refer to Saurina (2009a , 2009b ). Fillat and Garriga (2010) , propose a dynamic loan-loss-provisioning system. These authors find that had the U.S. adopted a dynamic loan-loss-provisioning system prior to the recent financial crisis the needed capital injections under the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) would have been cut in half. One of the main limitations of this study was the inability to control for the endogenous response of bank behavior.
The question is, how to control for loan demand and loan supply when studying loan loss provisioning. Beatty and Liao (2009) , make a valuable contribution by highlighting the importance of controlling for loan demand and supply as an identification strategy. They reiterate the importance of the work done by Kashyap and Stein (2000) who employ individual bank level data approach to mitigate the loan supply and loan demand identification problem. To that extent, they use bank size and liquidity to identify these channels. In more recent research Kishan and Opiela (2006) , show that the use of bank level data can help identify loan supply but fails to identify loan demand.
To date, all studies that address mitigating procyclicality and capital volatility through timely loan loss provisioning have yet to sufficiently address the loan supply and loan demand identification problem. Suppose we adequately address this identification issue, would we be able to infer something different about bank behavior? We attempt to answer the following question: Is it possible that banks could indeed be forward-looking in their loan loss provisioning? Since provisioning is the act of building reserves through the provision expense account to absorb losses of problem loans, a positive and statistically significant relationship between lagged loan loss provisioning and problem loans will signify a forward-looking approach to the provisioning process. Though FASB's accounting rules require an incurred loss approach to loan loss provisioning, surely the current crisis must have induced some level of learning on part of banks. It is not counterintuitive on the part of banks to adopt some level of forward-looking strategy in provisioning for loan losses to weather bad times and economic shocks.
In this paper, we use a confidential micro-level Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey (SLOOS) dataset to identify loan demand and loan supply at the bank level. We combine this with bank level Call Report data. We test if the banks' provisioning behavior is different before and after the crisis. We find, for the entire sample of banks, loan loss provisioning is forward-looking and statistically significant in the post crisis period. Our results show that the top quartiles of banks in our dataset exhibit a forward-looking approach to loan loss provisioning both in the pre-and postcrisis period.
II. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
In this study, we employ two sources of data to construct our panel. commercial real estate, commercial and industrial, home mortgage and consumer, 5 hence, these are the loan categories used in our study. Table 2 provides a description of our data.
As per Bassett et al. (2012) , we use the SLOOS survey data to compute a composite index of changes in loan supply (as measured by changes in standards) and loan demand for each of the banks in our panel of banks from 1997 to 2011. In this paper, we use loan standards and loan supply interchangeably as there is a direct relationship between loan standards and loan supply. If standards are tightened, loan supply will be reduced. We construct bank specific diffusion indices for loan standards and loan demand for our regression analysis. We verify that our diffusion indices are broadly consistent with Bassett et al. (2012) . Figure 1 plots the computed diffusion indexes corresponding to the standards and demand (expressed in percent) for our sample. Not surprisingly, 5 Consumer lending is further broken down into subcategories such as auto loans and credit cards. Unfortunately, differences in the breakdowns in consumer loans on the SLOOS and on the Call Reports made matching for consumer loans problematic. Hence, the consumer lending category was dropped from our sample the cyclical pattern of both these diffusion indexes qualitatively matches the various narrative accounts attributed to events in credit market conditions during this time period. The diffusion indices are based on the loan categories covered by the SLOOS: commercial real estate, commercial and industrial loans and home mortgage loans. The pre-crisis period was dominated by banks in quartile 1 and quartile 3 while the post-crisis period was dominated by quartile 2 and quartile 4 banks.
Given that our dataset is a dynamic panel with the composition of SLOOS banks changing over time, it is important for us to understand the time-varying dynamics and composition of our sample in order for us to provide a context for our regression model. Since the dataset is confidential, readers need to understand the nature the underlying bank level data that we are employing to make sense of the data underlying the results. In order for us to do this, we compute Markov chain transition probabilities to understand the distribution of our sample of SLOOS banks (We do not report this analysis in this paper but results can be provided upon request).
We track each SLOOS entity's movement or residence in a particular asset size quartile from 1997 to 2011. Our sample includes banks that have 15 consecutive quarters of data. The following observations can be made: First, the probability density is concentrated among banks residing in the same size bucket suggesting that there is not much movement between SLOOS size quartiles. Second, movement across quartiles is focused on SLOOS bank moving up to a higher size category. Downsizing activity is fairly small. Third, entry and exit is more prevalent for quartile 1 and quartile 2 banks and is limited for quartile 3 and 4. Hence, there is potential for survival bias to affect our overall results or the results for the bottom quartile firms. However, we do not see the potential problem with stronger (weaker) performing firms growing (shrinking) to cause a "performance bias" in the top and bottom quartiles of the banks. That is, a positive bias for top banks and a negative bias for bottom banks. By extension, we can say that the probability distribution would not be consistent with well (poorly) managed banks crossing size quartiles.
Hence, quartile-based analysis can be utilized.
III. EMPIRICAL AND MODEL STRATEGY
The purpose of this analysis is to examine if loan loss provisioning is either forward-looking or backward looking by effectively controlling for loan standards and loan demand. Following the crisis the poor performance of numerous banks through this episode provided additional, albeit anecdotal, evidence of the relationship between rapid growth of lending activity and the decline of loan quality. Less appreciated is the potential for there to be a feedback effect between loan quality, future lending activity and provisioning for loan losses under these circumstances. The problem of simultaneity is an issue in the examination of the relationship between loan loss provisioning and loan quality. The SLOOS data to some extent helps in identification by allowing for us to control for loan standards akin to loan supply and loan demand. Our model attempts to identify loan supply and loan demand faced by each bank in the sample, bank specific characteristics, market conditions, capital positions and to test the nature of loan loss provisioning before and after the crisis period. As
Balla and McKenna (2009) 
where the subscripts i and t index banks and quarters , respectively. The dependent variable is the log of total problem loans. In our sample, this is the sum of problem loans 90 days past due and nonaccruing in the following loan categories: commercial real estate, commercial and industrial loans and home mortgage loans. We estimate an unbalanced panel with bank fixed effects. We start by estimating Model (1) for the full sample of banks. We then proceed to run the same model for the first and fourth quartile of banks. Our sample period includes the recent financial crisis. Hence, the impact of the drivers of problem loans may be different before the financial crisis than in its aftermath. As a result, we split our sample into two subsamples: the pre-crisis sample spanning 
IV. RESULTS
Are loan loss provisioning forward-looking? Table 3 presents the regression estimates of the full sample of banks and the first quartile of banks. The coefficient on Log Provision for Loan Loss t-4 is positive and statistically significant for the full sample. It is positive but not statistically significant for the first quartile of banks. The positive and statistically significant relationship between lagged loan loss provisioning and problem loans is suggestive of loan loss provisioning being forward-looking. A one percent increase in loan loss provisioning at lag 4 is associated with an 18.3 percent increase in expected problem loans. The positive relationship continues to be positive at lag 8. However, the relationship is not statistically significant. Table 4 reports the coefficients for the same model but for the full sample and fourth quartile of banks. Here we see that coefficient on Log Provision for Loan Loss t-4 for the fourth quartile of banks is positive, larger than that for the first quartile and statistically significant. Here we find that a one percent increase in loan loss provisioning at lag 4 is associated with a 25.5 percent increase in expected problem loans. The forward-looking loan loss provisioning effect is larger for the fourth quartile banks.
In Tables 5 and 6 Interestingly, banks in the fourth quartile engaged in forward-looking loan loss provisioning both in the pre and post crisis period. From Table 6 , we see that Log Provision for Loan Loss t-4 and Log Provision for Loan Loss t-4 *Post-crisis have positive and statistically significant coefficients 0.102 and 0.128 respectively. For the full sample and banks in the fourth quartile (both pre and post crisis), the results are consistent with loan loss provisioning being forward-looking. The top-tier banks in this sample seem to have adopted loan loss provisioning as a tool to buffer against anticipated loan losses in the post-crisis period.
Accounting for Loan Supply and Loan Demand
The impact of change in standards (or supply) on total problem loans is not statistically significant for the full sample. However, changes in loan standards at lag 4 are statistically significant for the top quartile banks. From Table 6 , we find a one percent increase in standards at There is a negative and statistically significant relationship between change in loan demand and total problem loans at lag 4 for the entire sample and the top quartile. At lag 4, a one percent increase in loan demand results in 19.6 percent decline in total problem loans for the full sample of banks in the pre-crisis period and a 3.7 percent increase in the post-crisis period. For the top quartile, the corresponding numbers are decline of 15.2 percent in the pre-crisis and decline of 8.2 percent in the post-crisis periods. This negative relationship highlights an interesting point. This could imply that when loan officers perceive a decrease in loan demand, they are more likely to chase yields, that is, they can subtly lower their underwriting standards to generate the desired loan supply. Also, the S.L.O.O.S survey captures the loan officer's perception of loan demand and what he or she reports that demand to be. It is a qualitative variable that does not give any indication of how many applicants applied for a loan and how many succeeded in obtaining the loan. At best, this variable captures perceived demand as opposed to effective demand.
Capital and Loan Loss Provisioning
For the full sample of banks, we find that four quarter change in the capital asset ratio at lag 4 is associated with an increase in total problem loans. For the top quartile of banks the relationship is negative but not significant. No significant differences are found between the pre-and post-crisis period for impact of changes in the capital asset ratio on total problem loans for banks in the full sample or fourth quartile. The positive relationship between changes in the capital asset ratio at lag 4 and problem loans for the full sample of banks implies one of two things: Either better capitalized banks were taking on more risk in the loan portfolio or the banks were concerned about future loan quality and hence were adding capital to absorb potential write-offs 6 . Given our evidence of forward-looking loan loss provisioning, the latter explanation is consistent with banks adjusting lending standards and loan supply in response to emerging problems in the loan portfolio.
V. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this study is to study if banks are forward-looking in loan loss provisioning.
Using confidential Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey (SLOOS) data at the bank level to control for loan demand and loan supply, we find evidence of forward-looking loan loss provisioning for banks in the fourth quartile. Concurrently, we find that the largest banks reduce its exposure to loans by adjusting standards to reduce loan volume (or supply) when faced with loan losses in the future. We also find a positive relationship between changes in the capital asset ratio at lag 4 and 6 Research by Balla and Rose (2009) help to pin this down. Post SunTrust banks were limited in the amount of provisions they could set aside, hence at some point adding capital was the only way they could build a loss cushion.
problem loans for the full sample of banks. Given our evidence of forward-looking loan loss provisioning, it is plausible that banks adjust lending standards and loan supply in response to future problems in the loan portfolio. To date, our study is the first to show evidence of forwardlooking loan loss provisioning by some of the largest banks. We are able to test for evidence of this as we effectively control for loan demand and loan supply using micro-level bank data obtained from the SLOOS survey. No prior study has used micro-level loan demand and loan supply data to study this issue.
From a policy perspective, the top quartile of banks in our sample is engaged in forwardlooking loan loss provisioning. From an accounting stance, this maybe suggestive of the largest banks being engaged in earnings management and income smoothing than the smallest banks in our sample. However, from the banking regulation perspective, implementing forward-looking loan loss provisioning is economically intuitive and will help build a countercyclical buffer in strengthening banks. We need to be mindful that we strike a balance between having a loan loss provisioning system that will reduce earnings management and improving prudential regulation of banks that will allow for forward-looking loan loss provisioning that will dampen procyclicality of an incurred loss approach.
Table1: Provides the descriptive statistics for variables used in our model on a yearly basis. The data spans from 1997:Q1 to 2011:Q3. The minimum and maximum are not reported in order to preserve the confidentiality of the SLOOS participating banks. Reported are the regression coefficients and robust asymptotic standard errors clustered at the bank level (in parentheses) for Model (1). The dependent variable is the log of total amount of loans past due 90 days and nonaccruing. Total loans at lag 4 quarters are the log of total amount of loans captured in the Call Reports at lag 4. Total loans at lag 8 quarters are the log of total amount of loans captured in the Call Report at lag 8. Loan standards at lag 4 are the diffusion index of the change in lending standards 4 quarters ago. It takes continuous values ranging from -1 to 1. Loan standards at lag 8 are the diffusion index of the change in lending standards 2 years prior. Loan demand at lag 4 is the diffusion index of the change in loan demand 4 quarters ago. Loan demand at lag 8 is the diffusion index of the change in loan demand 2 years ago. The results for the full sample and the first quartile are reported. Here the crisis dummies are zero. (1) for the full sample and fourth quartile. In this panel, the post crisis dummies are zero. Prob>F 0.00 . *** Significant at 1% level ** Significant at 5% * Significant at 10% Prob>F 0.0000 . ***Significant at 1% level **Significant at 5% *Significant at 10% Figure 1 : Plots the computed diffusion indexes corresponding to the standards and demand (expressed as a percentage) for our sample. 
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